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Dowries have been modeled as pre-mortem bequests to daughters or as groom-prices paid to in-laws.
These two classes of models yield mutually exclusive predictions, but empirical tests of these predictions
have been mixed. We argue that the heterogeneity of findings can be explained by a heterogeneous
world--some households use dowries as a bequest and others use dowries as a price. We estimate a
model with heterogeneous dowry motives and use the predictions from the competing theories in an
exogenous switching regression to place households in the price or bequest regime. Our empirical
strategy generates multiple, independent checks on the validity of regime assignment. Using retrospective
marriage data from rural Bangladesh, we find robust evidence of heterogeneity in dowry motives in
the population; that bequest dowries have declined in prevalence and amount over time; and that bequest
households are better off compared to price households on a variety of welfare measures.
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In the last decade a sharp debate has emerged over the predominance of dowry in
South Asia. With the historical knowledge that dowries tend to disappear as societies
modernize, the persistence of substantial bride-to-groom marriage transfers has long
been a puzzle for social scientists. Recently, in the wake of increasingly male-favored
sex ratios, and with dowries in South Asia currently representing upwards of several
multiples of a bride’s family’s annual income (Suran, Amin, Huq, and Chowdury,
2004; Rao, forthcoming), accounting for dowry has attained a new urgency for scholars
and policy-makers alike. Attempts to explain this puzzle have centered on the very
understanding of what dowry represents: a price or a bequest.
First formalized by Becker (1981), the price model sees dowries as transfers be-
tween families, in which brides do not directly beneﬁt. Such transfers may be neces-
sary for a number of reasons. Cultural factors such as hypergamy (women marrying
“up” the social ladder) or tendency for brides to marry older men (in the context
of population growth) may create a perpetual scarcity of grooms, such that dowry
emerges to draw high-quality men into the marriage market (Rao, 1993; Anderson,
2003). Else, if rules for division of household output are inﬂexible, and a woman’s
shadow price in the marriage market exceeds her share of income, dowry will emerge
as an upfront transfer to equilibriate the marriage market (Botticini and Siow, 2003).
Finally, greater heterogeneity in market earnings among men than among women may
produce dowry as a mechanism by which brides attract high-quality grooms (Ander-
son, 2004). Regardless of their diﬀerences, these explanations share one feature: they
are grounded in a model of dowry as a price that clears the marriage market.
A competing set of answers to the dowry puzzle, only recently formalized in the
economics literature, views dowry as bequests, in which parents transfer their inheri-
tance to daughters at the time of marriage. If there are institutional or legal barriers to
women’s ability to inherit property, particularly in virilocal societies (where daughters
leave their natal household at marriage), dowry may emerge as a culturally-sanctioned
method of bequest (Zhang and Chan, 1999). Alternatively, in virilocal societies, a
pre-mortem bequest to daughters may emerge as a method of maintaining sons’ in-
centive to exert full eﬀort in maintaining their parents’ estate (Botticini and Siow,
2003). Finally, if such societies are marked by poor protection of women in their
in-laws’ households, dowry may improve brides’ outside option in a bargaining set-
2ting, and thus mitigate the incidence of domestic violence and other forms of abuse
(Brown, 2003). All of these explanations view dowry as a transfer to the daughter,
and under her control, at the time of marriage.
The policy implications of this debate are critical: if dowries are bequests, they
should be protected, as they represent culturally-sanctioned access to property for
women (Kishwar, 1989; Goody, 1998). More generally, dowry as bequest can improve
brides’ consumption within in-laws’ households, thereby improving women’s welfare.
If dowries are a groom-price, the practice of dowry should arguably be banned, par-
ticularly in South Asia, as it increases the perceived cost of raising daughters and
thus may contribute to worsening sex ratios through selective abortion, infanticide,
and diﬀerential child mortality by gender. To date, bans of dowry have taken the
form of largely ineﬀectual “paper laws,” but momentum is gaining among activists
and policy-makers to make the prohibition of dowries bite, by publicizing regulations,
increasing the penalties for violations, and making reporting to authorities more at-
tractive (Setalvad, 1988; Menski, 1998; Basu, 2005).
With the stakes set so high, the empirical evidence is mixed. To date, no large-
sample survey in South Asia directly asks respondents to identify the recipient of
the dowry transfer, since groom-prices are technically banned. Researchers must
therefore use indirect measures to assess the function of dowry. Such indirect tests,
in South Asia and elsewhere, have yielded contrary results, sometimes within the
same paper (see Table 1). Meanwhile, drawing on village case studies, historians and
anthropologists have argued that the system of dowry in India and Bangladesh has
transformed over the recent decades from bequest to price—yet their reliance on small
samples and sparse archival records renders the generalizability of such conclusions
suspect (Lindenbaum, 1981; Ahmed and Naher, 1987; Sharma, 1984).
We propose a simple explanation for the mixed results in the literature: hetero-
geneity in dowry motives, and develop a theoretical and empirical strategy to deal
with this heterogeneity. All prior large-sample studies take a particular model of
dowry as given, regress dowry amounts on bride, groom and marriage market char-
acteristics, and infer support for the model from the sign of estimated coeﬃcients on
theoretically “important” variables. In the presence of heterogeneity, however, such
a strategy is misguided, precisely because average coeﬃcients are uninformative as
to the actual functioning of dowry. By acknowledging instead that both models may
hold—for diﬀerent subsets of the population—we use their theoretical predictions to
3structure a switching regression model with unknown sample separation to sort the
marriage market into “bequest households” and “price households.” More precisely,
we use the theories to help predict households’ probability of regime membership and
estimate a probability-weighted dowry function for each regime.
There are four central ﬁndings. First, using retrospective data from the 1996
Matlab Health and Socioeconomic Survey, we ﬁnd substantial evidence of two dowry
regimes in rural Bangladesh. In particular, of marriages from 1920 to the present in
which a dowry was given, more than a quarter used dowry as bequest. Second, the
function mapping bride household, groom household, and marriage market charac-
teristics to dowry amounts (the dowry function) diﬀers signiﬁcantly between regimes.
Third, dowries increasingly serve as a groom-price, and while bequest dowries are
falling in size, price dowries are rising. We fail, however, to ﬁnd evidence of a “mar-
riage squeeze” driving dowry inﬂation. Finally, bequest households are considerably
better oﬀ—in schooling, assets, and other measures of welfare—than price households.
Beyond its contribution to the literature on dowries, our paper presents a general
methodology that can be fruitfully adopted in other debates where there is more than
one model and no clear victor. We oﬀer three methodological advances on similar
papers which proactively use theory in a switching regression framework in order
to locate sources of heterogeneity.1 First, rather than rely on a single characteris-
tic as the predictor of regime membership, we utilize a number of predictions from
the competing theories—thus enabling each estimate to serve as a validity check on
the others. Second, we generate a novel type of prediction of regime membership:
a “non”-membership prediction, which indicates the likelihood that an observation
does not fall within a given regime. As such, we oﬀer a new method of classifying
regime membership which may be more readily derived from economic models than
“membership” predictions. Finally, employing these non-membership predictions (in
the switching equation) as well as predictions regarding regime speciﬁcations (in the
regime equations) allows us multiple robustness checks by relaxing diﬀerent assump-
tions. Our strategy may prove of interest in areas as wide-ranging as unitary vs.
non-income-pooling households, separability vs. non-separability of household pro-
duction and consumption, strategic vs. altruistic bequests, and the permanent income
1Two recent examples of this approach are Kopczuk and Lupton (forthcoming), which investigates
heterogeneity in bequest motives of the elderly, and Vakis, Sadoulet, de Janvry, and Caﬁero (2004),
which looks at heterogeneity in the separability of household consumption from production.
4hypothesis, by oﬀering empirical researchers new strategies for using theory to locate
sources of heterogeneity.
2 Two Theories of Dowry
In this section we reformulate existing price and bequest theories in a framework
that highlights the salient distinctions between the two classes of models, and extract
predictions for regime membership which we exploit in the empirical analysis.
2.1 Price Model
Since Becker (1981) broke open the economic modeling of marriage payments and
oﬀered the ﬁrst formal statement of the price model, a number of authors have de-
veloped various theoretical predictions for aspects and eﬀects of dowries (Rao, 1993;
Grossbard-Shechtman, 1993; Sen, 1998; Mukherjee, 2003; Dasgupta and Mukherjee,
2003; Anderson, 2003, 2004; Dalmia, 2004; Tertilt, 2005; Mukherjee and Mondal,
2006). The model presented below highlights the shared properties of these models
while generating a number of useful predictions which we take to the data. The crit-
ical feature of price models, for our purposes, is that the dowry is transferred from
the bride’s family to the groom’s family to equilibriate the marriage market. As such,
the model yields a dowry function that maps characteristics of the bride, groom, and
their respective families, as well as underlying features of the marriage market, to a
dowry amount.
Marriage decisions are made by the parents (the “family”) of each spouse. Each
family chooses a spouse for their child to maximize utility. The groom’s family
(indexed by G) has utility UG = UG(cG,wS,wD), where cG is parental consump-
tion and wS is the son’s wealth. The groom’s parents choose wD, the wealth of
their desired daughter-in-law, to maximize utility subject to the budget constraint
cG = wG + τ(wD;wS,R), taking wG (the groom’s parents’ pre-transfer wealth), wS,
R, and τ(·) as given. R is a shifter of the dowry function that is not related to the
individual bride or groom’s household (for example, sex ratio, year of marriage, re-
gion, etc.). Here, τ(·) is a function mapping each prospective bride to a transfer that
sustains the match, given wS and R. The solution to this problem yields a schedule
5of transfers, DG, that sustain each bride-groom pairing acceptable to the groom’s
parents (analogous to an inverse demand function): DG = DG(wD,wS,wG,R). The
bride’s family (indexed by P) faces a similar problem, except that they pay the trans-
fer. They choose wS to maximize their utility UP = UP(cP,wD,wS) subject to the
budget constraint cP = wP − τ(wS;wD,R), taking wP, wD, R and τ(·) as given.
Again, the solution yields a schedule of transfers that sustain each bride-groom pair-
ing acceptable to the bride’s parents: DP = DP(wD,wS,wP,R).
In equilibrium, the marginal utility of the spouse traits to consumption, for both










At any given value of R, a bride-groom pairing can only be sustained in equi-
librium when DG = DP. This gives us a dowry function—a schedule mapping each
bride-groom pair to an equilibrium transfer: D∗ = D∗(wD,wS,wP,wG,R). In this
setting, every bride-groom combination is feasible given a transfer of the right amount,
since we have not restricted transfers to be non-negative. Figure 1 demonstrates this
graphically—a woman of wealth wD can match with any man, given the appropriate
dowry.
We now summarize two key predictions of the price model of dowry that we will
use to identify regime membership in the empirical section. First, the dowry that
sustains any particular couple is determined by the characteristics of the bride and
her family (a vector W), the groom and his family (a vector H), and a vector R of
parameters such as sex ratio that “shift” the dowry function. In reduced form, we
can write:
DΠ = gΠ(H,W,R) (1)
where D is dowry amount, g(·) is the dowry function, and Π indexes the price regime.
Second, we have a non-membership prediction for marriages in the price regime which
should see no dowry transferred:
• DΠ = 0 in a love (or “self-arranged”) marriage.2
2This prediction has a long history in the literature on marriage transfers, going back to Goode
(1963) and Becker (1981) and recently discussed by Dasgupta and Mukherjee (2003) and Edlund
and Lagerl¨ of (2004). First, and most simply, in a love marriage the selection of the spouse is made
6Furthermore, a number of authors have made clear predictions about the dowry
function itself. We refer to these as testable predictions—rather than taking them as
given, we will empirically test their substantive signiﬁcance:
• Ceteris paribus, dowry amount moves inversely with bride’s “positive” char-
acteristics (or “quality”) and positively with groom’s “positive” characteris-
tics. These features may include human capital attainment, ability to make
economic contributions to groom’s household (Becker, 1981; Behrman, Foster,
Rosenzweig, and Vashishtha, 1999), and non-economic characteristics such as
caste (Anderson, 2003). In short, attributes substitute for dowry amount.
• Ceteris paribus, dowry amount moves inversely with the male-to-female sex
ratio (Grossbard-Shechtman, 1993) or age-adjusted sex ratio (Rao, 1993). As
a transfer that equilibriates the marriage market, dowry is a function of excess
supply.
2.2 Bequest Model
The bequest theory does not merely view dowry as an intergenerational transfer—
the idea is that in dowry-giving societies, inheritance is given to a son at the time
of parents’ death but to a daughter upon her marriage. Key to such a model is
the notion that some friction prevents daughters from inheriting upon their parents’
death. Most scholars stress the combination of virilocality and poor property rights:
since women face barriers to inheriting after moving to their in-laws’ household, they
must receive their inheritance at the time of marriage.3
While the bequest explanation has a long tradition in anthropology (Tambiah,
1973, for example), only recently have economists developed the notion that dowry
functions as pre-mortem inheritance into models that can be estimated (Zhang and
Chan, 1999; Edlund, 2001; Botticini and Siow, 2003; Suen, Chan, and Zhang, 2003;
by bride and groom, not by their parents, as the price model requires. Second, such a marriage will
not be under the same market pressures present in the implicit dowry market. Another way to put it
is that a model of dowry as price assumes that dowry allows parents of daughters to secure alliances
with high-quality in-laws. Thus, love marriages, where parents are not the decision-makers, should
see no dowry transferred.
3Botticini and Siow (2003) maintain the assumption that virilocality is crucial to the existence of
dowry, but posit that parents’ inability to monitor their son’s eﬀort forces them to make an ineﬃcient
pre-mortem bequest to their daughter in order to properly incentivize the son’s management of the
household estate.
7Brown, 2003). Of these papers, only Botticini and Siow (2003) develops the idea that
a model of dowry as bequest must be nested within a marriage market—and that
a premarital transfer to their daughter automatically improves the groom she will
attract. We draw from this insight in constructing the model below.
Using subscripts P for bride’s parents, D for the bride, and S for the son-in-law,
the bride’s parents derive utility UP from her marriage such that: UP = U(cP,cD,cS),
a function increasing and concave in all arguments. Here, cP is consumption of the
parents; cD is the “marital wealth” of the daughter (the wealth that she brings into
her marriage), and cS is the marital wealth of the son-in-law. Parents maximize
utility by choosing the size of the dowry transfer τ, which is made to the daughter.
The parental budget constraint is: cP = wP −τ, where wP is the parent’s pre-transfer
wealth, and τ is constrained to be non-negative.4
Now we turn to the daughter. The ﬁrst key feature of the model is the assumption,
following Lam (1988); Peters and Siow (2002) and Botticini and Siow (2003), that a
bride’s characteristics, such as age, education, and number of siblings, are exogenously
mapped by the marriage market to a scalar which we call “pre-marital wealth”. This
allows us to write: wD = f(XD), where wD is her pre-marital wealth and XD is a
vector of characteristics. This mapping allows us to state the “marital wealth” cD
that the daughter brings into her marriage as: cD = wD + τ.
Finally we consider the son-in-law. The second key feature of the model is that
we nest the choice of dowry amount within a assortative matching framework. Since
brides and grooms can be ranked by marital wealth, each woman of marital wealth
cD attracts a groom of marital wealth cS = h(cD), where the existence of the weakly-
monotonic mapping h(·) follows from assortative mating.5 Substituting, the bride’s
parents choose τ to maximize: UP = U(wP − τ,wD + τ,h(wD + τ)). In the interior,










In addition, the non-negativity constraint on τ yields a possible corner solution τ∗ = 0.
By the monotonicity of h(·), equation (2) identiﬁes τ∗. In other words, since
4While we do not formally model the source of the non-negativity constraint on bequests, it
arises naturally out of capital market imperfections which prevent daughters from borrowing before
marriage. Baland and Robinson (2000) make this point in a diﬀerent context.
5Existence of equilibrium in wealth matching models is shown in Peters and Siow (2002).
8son-in-law’s marital wealth is simply a function of the daughter’s marital wealth, the
choice of dowry amount will not depend on the son-in-law’s wealth. We can thus write
a schedule of optimal dowry amounts τ∗ as a function only of parents’ and daughter’s
pre-marital wealth: τ∗(wP,wD) = τ∗(wP,f(XD)).
In this setting, unlike in the price model, dowry cannot substitute for groom’s
characteristics. The intuition is straightforward: since the transfer can only be made
to daughters, any attempt to improve parental utility by securing a superior son-in-law
can only occur by improving the daughter’s marital wealth ranking among prospective
brides. We demonstrate this graphically in Figure 2. Vertical axes represent the
marital wealth of brides and grooms. A bride of pre-marital wealth wD will marry
a groom of marital wealth h(wD + τ), where τ is chosen by the bride’s parents to
maximize parental utility, so that the thick line represents the range of possible grooms
a bride may match with.
This result gives us a valuable “reduced-form restriction” which we use in the
estimation:
DB = gB(W) (3)
where B indexes the bequest regime and gB(•) is the dowry function. That is, the
dowry amount in the bequest regime depends solely on W, the vector of characteristics
of the bride and her family (including XD and wP). To put it another way, once the
bride’s characteristics and the dowry amount are known, the knowledge of groom’s
characteristics do not add any additional information, and should be excluded from
the estimation.
Furthermore, the logic of the bequest theory yields a number of non-membership
predictions that describe the characteristics of families who will not give a dowry as
bequest:
• DB = 0 if the bride remains within the household after marriage. Virilocality
combined with the cessation of daughters’ ability to inherit drive the pre-mortem
bequest.
• DB = 0 if the bride’s parents have died before her marriage. Again, since
daughters face no barriers to inheritance before moving away, they will have
already inherited.
• DB = 0 if the bride has been previously married, since she will have received
9her bequest at the time of her ﬁrst marriage.
• The Botticini and Siow (2003) model oﬀers an additional prediction: DB = 0 if
the brides has no brothers of the age of majority at the time of marriage.6
The bequest theory also oﬀers predictions about the dowry function in this regime:
• Ceteris paribus, dowry amount moves inversely with the bride’s number of
brothers of the age of majority. In the bequest theory, sons do not “attract”
dowry from their in-laws—thus, each brother represents another drain on the
inheritance pool.
• Ceteris paribus, a higher dowry improves the bride’s well-being, both by increas-
ing her marital wealth and by improving the quality of her potential groom.
3 Heterogeneity in Dowry Motives
We argue in this section that the bulk of the historical and anthropological evidence
points toward two models of dowry: bequest and price.7 After a brief discussion of
previous empirical work, highlighting the pitfalls involved in imposing homogeneity of
dowry motive, we provide a simple model which relaxes this assumption. We consider
a bifurcated marriage market in which some unknown fraction of households only use
dowries as bequests (the “bequest regime”), and the rest use dowries as a price (the
“price regime”). This model, grounded in the theoretical predictions stated in the
previous section, serves as the basis for the empirical work that follows.
3.1 Historical and Anthropological Accounts
The earliest reference to dowry in South Asia dates almost two millenia ago—when
Manu decreed stridhan [dowry] to represent the “sixfold property of a woman” (Old-
enburg, 2002). The origins of dowry in South Asia almost certainly lie in a system
6If a bride has no brothers (or if her brothers are below the age of majority at the time of her
marriage), the incentive problem that forces an ineﬃcient pre-mortem bequest is vitiated. Any
bequest will be given upon her parents’ death or at the time when any brother reaches the age of
majority and assumes responsibility for managing the parents’ estate.
7This discussion serves as motivation, but in the empirics we do not require that both regimes
exist—on the contrary, the switching regression approach allows us to explicitly test whether the
two-regime model ﬁts the data better than a single-regime model.
10of premortem inheritance, but most scholars document a gradual transformation of
dowry from bequest to price beginning sometime in the late nineteenth century (Tam-
biah, 1973; Srinivas, 1984; Banerjee, 1999).8 At any given point in time, however,
there is evidence of heterogeneity of opinion about dowry. Some nineteenth century
observers viewed dowry as an unambiguous bequest: “[I]f the daughter receives some-
thing at the time of her marriage,” a Bengali defender of dowry wrote in 1887, “then
is that not a good thing? When the father is compelled to spend money for his daugh-
ter, and that sum accrues to the in-laws or to the bridegroom, in the ultimate analysis
the daughter is the principal beneﬁciary” (cited in Majumdar (2004, pgs. 445-446)).
In precisely the same period, critiques of dowry began to proliferate, particularly in
Calcutta, all citing the language of the marketplace to describe the increasing “price”
of grooms (Majumdar, 2004).
Anthropologists’ accounts, generally drawing from long-term ﬁeldwork in a small
number of villages, likewise reﬂect considerable heterogeneity in dowry motives, both
in the assessment of scholars and in the views of their informants. One anthropologist
who conducted ﬁeldwork in Himachal Pradesh and Punjab during the late 1970s re-
ported that her informants (mostly Hindu) saw dowry as a pre-mortem inheritance to
daughters, yet her own observations led her to conclude that dowry amounts moved as
a price in a marriage market (Sharma, 1984, pg. 351). Another, conducting ﬁeldwork
in the 1980s among urban Protestants in Madras, found that respondents overwhelm-
ingly perceived dowry as a groom-price, noting that dowry amounts fell with aspects
of a bride’s perceived quality (Caplan, 1984).9 As with the historical evidence, an-
thropological accounts almost universally document a transformation of dowry from
bequest to price. This trend is evident in Comilla, the district of Bangladesh from
which our survey data comes. As early as the 1950s, a new form of marriage transfer
emerged in which potential grooms detailed the list of items they would accept in
8Considerable evidence from other dowry-giving societies around the world similarly points to
the coexistence of bequest and price dowries, and the transformation from bequest dowries to price
dowries over time (Kaplan, 1985; Nazzari, 1991).
9Such discussions abound in South Asian literature. For instance, early in Kamala Markandaya’s
1954 Nectar in a Sieve, a South Indian mother assesses potential grooms for her daughter: “At last
we found one who seemed to fulﬁll our requirements: he was young and well favoured, the only son
of his father from whom he would one day inherit a good portion of land.
‘They will expect a large dowry,’ I said regretfully. ‘One hundred rupees will not win such a
husband, we have no more.’
‘She is endowed with beauty,’ Old Granny said. ‘It will make up for a small dowry—in this case.’
” (New York, John Day, pgs. 39-40).
11exchange for marriage—these payments were often called by the English word “de-
mand,” reﬂecting the price motive of the dowry (Lindenbaum, 1981; Kabeer, 2001).
Concomitant with the transition in the function of dowry, anthropological work
indicates a change in the form of payment. As bequest dowry declined in prevalence,
dowries increasingly began to be paid in cash, over which brides rarely exercised
control in their in-laws’ household (Sharma, 1984; Caplan, 1984). While the data we
use does not include information about respondents’ control over diﬀerent types of
dowry, survey data from elsewhere in South Asia support this generalization.10
In sum, a survey of the historical and anthropological evidence on dowry points
not only to heterogeneity of dowry motives, but establishes that there are two (and
only two) predominant explanations for the function of dowry, which correspond to
our price and bequest models. Furthermore, the literature provides two claims we
use as checks to the validity of our empirical results:
• Dowry as bequest has been declining in prevalence over time.
• Dowries as bequests are less likely to be cash-only, since cash is not a resource
over which brides exercise control within the in-laws’ household.
3.2 Previous Empirical Work
Contrary to the evidence presented above, most empirical studies of dowry proceed
by taking either the price or bequest model as given. There are two central problems
with this strategy. First, in the presence of heterogeneity, testing each theory’s pre-
dictions about the speciﬁc nature of the dowry function is only feasible once regime
membership has been determined—a point we develop below. Second, tests often
rest on predictions common to both models. Previous tests of the bequest model
adopt a “welfare” approach, focusing on the prediction that ceteris paribus, higher
dowries increase bride’s welfare. Accordingly, the strategy has been to regress mea-
sures of bride’s welfare on dowry amount and a number of controls (Zhang and Chan,
10The Survey on the Status of Women and Fertility in Uttar Pradesh and Tamil Nadu (Smith,
Ghuman, Lee, and Mason, 2000) asked randomly-sampled brides about the control they exercise
over diﬀerent forms of dowry. In marriages where cash dowry was given as dowry, fewer than 10%
of respondents reported that they had the “major say” in how the cash was spent, and more than
70% reported that they had no say at all. In marriages where jewelry, gold, or silver was given,
more than 47% of respondents reported that they had the major say in how it was used or whether
it could be sold, while fewer than 25% reported that they had no say at all.
121999; Brown, 2003; Suran, Amin, Huq, and Chowdury, 2004; Esteve-Volart, 2004).11
However, this is not a viable test of the bequest model. Indeed, we generated above
the price model’s prediction that, ceteris paribus, higher dowry attracts higher qual-
ity grooms. If, for example, we accept Zhang and Chan’s (1999) hypothesis that
husbands’ willingness to help with the chores is valued by brides’ families (and thus
improve when her threat point improves), then such measures would also increase the
price of a groom in the price model. As such, a conﬁrmation of the bequest model
using the “welfare” approach is no more than a conﬁrmation that either the price or
bequest theory holds. Our approach is therefore to avoid direct measures of welfare,
instead focusing on the aspects of the theories in which their predictions diverge.
Two recent papers share our concern for considering heterogeneity of dowry mo-
tives, but attack the problem diﬀerently: both posit historical reasons for taking
the sample separation as known (Anderson, 2004; Esteve-Volart, 2004).12 We view
our contribution as complementary but methodologically distinct. First, our frame-
work allows us to test for the very existence of two dowry functions, by comparing
the two-regime speciﬁcation to one in which all households are pooled. Second, our
placement of marriages into regimes is grounded in theory, rather than in historical
evidence, allowing us to use historical predictions as separate validity checks on our
results. Third, by sorting households based on observed behavior, we can examine
the characteristics of households in each regime, rather than assigning households to
regimes by construction. This allows us to test, for example, the claim of opponents
to dowry bans that bequest households are poorer than price households.
3.3 Marriage Market Heterogeneity
We propose a simple model of a bifurcated marriage market which nests these previous
approaches as a special case. Consider a marriage market in which a fraction α of
11The reasoning, although not always explicitly stated, is that dowry improves the bride’s welfare
by increasing the overall amount of resources available to her (new) family, as well as by improving
her threat point or bargaining position within the marriage. Zhang and Chan (1999) uses whether
a husband helped with the chores as a measure of wife’s welfare; Brown (2003) expands the indices
of welfare to include household consumption of women’s goods; Esteve-Volart (2004) tests Becker’s
(1981, pg. 28) observation that one function of dowry is to protect women from divorce; and Suran,
Amin, Huq, and Chowdury (2004) looks at levels of reported domestic violence.
12Anderson (2004) separates the sample of Pakistani households into rural and urban; Esteve-
Volart (2004), using the same dataset as the one used in our paper, separates the sample into Hindu
and Muslim. Both papers estimate separate dowry functions by subsample, and conclude on the
basis of parameter estimates that dowry indeed functions diﬀerently in the groups.
13households only give dowry as a bequest to brides. In this group, the dowry of
each household is given by the function gB(•) given in equation (3), which maps the
household’s characteristics to a dowry amount. The rest of the households, fraction
1 − α, never give a bequest to the daughter at the time of marriage—among these
households, if dowry is given, it serves as a transfer that equilibriates the marriage
market. The function gΠ(•) given in equation (1) maps the characteristics of both
sides, and of the marriage market as a whole, to a dowry amount. Without knowledge
of “regime membership”, any estimate of the dowry function will be biased—indeed,
the estimated coeﬃcient on any given regressor may lie outside the range of true
coeﬃcients in both regimes (Morduch and Stern, 1997).
There are two important restrictions placed by this model. First, there are only
two dowry functions. Here, we note that the price and bequest models represent
the only major theories of dowry in the anthropological, historical, and economics
literature—furthermore, these two explanations subsume all explanations given by
participants in the dowry system. Dowries cannot simply be explained as traditional
behavior, since dowry amounts ﬂuctuate dramatically over time, and since in many
places (including Matlab, as noted above) dowry is a recent phenomenon, emerging
only within the last few decades. Likewise, unlike wedding celebrations (Bloch, Rao,
and Desai, 2004), in rural Bangladesh dowry transactions are made privately and
amounts are often kept fairly secret (Suran, Amin, Huq, and Chowdury, 2004), so
that status is an unlikely candidate to explain dowry amounts.
Second, we restrict any given dowry to fall within one regime. The theoretical jus-
tiﬁcation follows from our characterization of the regimes: the key diﬀerence between
price households and bequest households is that the latter face a constraint in secur-
ing property of inheritance for daughters. It stands to reason that a similar problem
would emerge if a bequest household arranged a match with a price household—how
would bequest parents be assured that the part of the dowry earmarked as bequest
is not expropriated? Under the reasonable assumption that in-laws discuss dowry
before the match, bequest parents will take care to match with other households in
the bequest regime. The threat of social sanctions in the context of a rural marriage
market lends weight to the claim that bequest dowries were not “transformed” into
price dowries by the groom’s family.13
13There is some evidence of a rise in post-marital extortion of dowry beginning around the late
1990s—after our 1996 survey (Suran, Amin, Huq, and Chowdury, 2004), a practice which may have
144 Empirical Strategy
The goal of our empirical strategy is to answer four questions regarding heterogeneity
in dowry motives. First, are there both bequest and price households in the data?
Second, how many households use dowry as bequest versus as price? Third, what
characteristics can identify whether a given household uses dowry as bequest versus
as price? Fourth, what are the dowry functions, which map characteristics to dowry
amounts, in each regime?
The econometric model we employ is an exogenous switching regression with un-
known sample separation. Switching regressions were introduced to economics by
Quandt (1958) and have been reﬁned subsequently (Goldfeld and Quandt, 1976;
Dickens and Lang, 1985; Lee and Porter, 1984). If subsets of the data are produced
by distinct but unknown data generating processes, switching regressions are used
to classify the observations into their respective regime. We write a three-equation
system that involves two regime equations (one for bequest and one for price), and
a switching equation that assigns to each household a probability of being in each
regime. The system is solved using a maximum likelihood procedure.
Ultimately, the switching regression approach allows us to address our central em-
pirical questions. First, the estimated coeﬃcients in the switching equation identify
characteristics that place households in each regime. Second, we use the estimated
probability of regime membership to slice the sample into “more likely bequest” and
“more likely price” households and then compare their characteristics. Finally, the es-
timated coeﬃcients in the regime equations identify a dowry function for each regime,
using all observations in the sample (where each observation is weighted by its esti-
mated probability of membership in that regime).
Our methodological innovation lies in the way we use theory to structure the
switching regression model. An advantage of the plenitude of predictions given by
the theoretical models is that we can use several separate predictions at once, thereby
simultaneously estimating the model and assessing the validity of regime placement.
In so doing, we hope to address a common skepticism levied at switching regressions
as asking too much of the data when sample separation is unknown. We use a
speciﬁcation that draws on the most information from theory. We restrict the sample
to positive dowries, which justiﬁes including the non-membership prediction variables
spread from India (Bloch and Rao, 2002).
15in the switching equation. Simultaneously, we draw from the reduced form theoretical
result that, in bequest households, marriage market and groom-side variables do not
aﬀect the dowry amount. Marriage market as well as bride and groom characteristics
(as well as characteristics of their families) enter the switching and price equations,
but only bride family characteristics enter the bequest equation. We check our results
against the historical and anthropological predictions that bequest dowries are on the
decline and are less likely to be given as cash-only. Finally, we relax the theoretical
restrictions to gauge the robustness of the results.
4.1 Empirical Speciﬁcation
We represent dowry amount in the price regime as DΠ and in the bequest regime as
DB. The vector x ≡ {H,W,R} contains all characteristics of the marriage that are
theorized to aﬀect dowry amount: characteristics of the bride and her family (W);
characteristics of the groom and his family (H); and features of the marriage market
at the time of marriage (R). The econometric model is a three-equation system:
Price regime: DΠ = xΠβΠ + Π
Bequest regime: DB = xBβB + B
Switching equation: λ
∗ = zβλ + λ
The parameter vectors of interest are βΠ, βB, and βλ. Here, DΠ, DB, and λ∗ are
latent. Only the dowry amount D is observed, given by:
D =
(
DΠ if λ∗ < 0
DB if λ∗ ≥ 0
We will turn to the identiﬁcation of the model in a moment. First, let us consider
the variables that enter each equation. In the price regime, groom-side, bride-side,
and marriage market characteristics enter the dowry function. However, using the
reduced-form restrictions derived from theory, we constrain the bequest regime equa-
tion to include only bride-side variables. This approach of applying theoretical con-
straints to one regime mirrors the identiﬁcation strategy adopted by Vakis, Sadoulet,
16de Janvry, and Caﬁero (2004). This gives:
xΠ = {H,W,R} = x
xB = {W}
Moving to the switching equation, in addition to the variables in x, we include the non-
membership variables K in the switching equation, to exploit the non-membership
predictions. In form, this strategy resembles that of Lee and Porter (1984) and
Kopczuk and Lupton (forthcoming), with one key diﬀerence: our switching equation
identiﬁes the non-membership of marriages within a regime given their existence in
the restricted sample of strictly positive dowries. The idea is that certain households
should not be observed giving dowry if the predictions of one of the theories holds.
Thus, if the household is observed giving dowry, it is more likely to be in the other
regime. In essence, we are identifying household regime by drawing from theoretical
predictions about speciﬁc households’ non-participation in the dowry system, due to
their participation in the dowry system.
The logic behind the strategy is as follows. In the theoretical section, we generated
predictions about who will not pay dowries in each regime. Speciﬁcally, positive
dowries will not be observed in the “price regime” in a love marriage. As such, if we
observe a love marriage with a dowry, theory would tell us that this is not a price
dowry.14 Similarly, positive dowries will not be observed in the “bequest regime” in a
number of cases: if the bride has no brothers, if a bride marries within the household,
or if a bride’s parents have died. Thus we have:
z = {H,W,R,K}
where K represents variables that identify regime membership but are uncorrelated
with the errors in the regime equations. From the theoretical predictions, we have
a number of such variables: (1) whether the bride had male siblings of the age of
majority at the time of marriage; (2) whether the bride’s parents were alive at the
time of marriage; (3) whether the marriage was self-arranged (a love marriage); and
(4) whether the bride married within the household. Including these variables in
the switching equation allows us to infer (ex post) from the sign of the estimated
14More precisely, throughout, we assume that such marriages in which positive dowry is given
more likely to be in the other regime.
17coeﬃcients which regime is which. This in turn gives us an instant validity check on
the outcome of the regression: if the signs of the estimated coeﬃcients “disagree”—in
the sense that if the sign on “bride had brothers of the age of majority at marriage”
points to the second regime as being the bequest regime, while the sign on “bride
married within household” points to the ﬁrst as being the bequest regime, we will
not be able to identify the regimes.
Is it plausible to exclude all of these variables from the regime equations? The
number of brothers should directly aﬀect a family’s ability to pay a high dowry, partic-
ularly in the price regime, where each brother brings in an amount that may be used
for his sister’s marriage. To deal with this issue, we include the number of brothers
in both the switching and regime equations. Our reasoning here is that the dummy
variable “no brothers” captures the absence of bequest motive, while the number
of brothers will capture the income eﬀect that enters the dowry equation in both
regimes. Similarly, the dowry function remains unchanged in either regime regard-
less of whether the bride’s parents are alive at the time of marriage or whether the
bride marries within the household—theory predicts only that the variables capture
the absence of bequest motive. Finally, “love marriage” is only relevant insofar as it
eliminates the recipient of the transfer in the price regime, and thus a positive dowry
should only be observed in love match if the household is in the bequest regime.
To identify the model, we must place some restrictions on the error terms (Mad-




λ respectively, and we normalize σλ = 1. A randomly-
selected marriage i has probability 1−λ = Φ(−xiβλ) of belonging to the price regime,
and probability λ of being in the bequest regime. The probability density function of
observed dowry amounts is therefore a mixture of two distributions:
f(Di) = (1 − λ)φΠ(Di − xΠiβΠ) + λφB(Di − xBiβB)
Here, φΠ and φB are the probability distributions of Π and B. For a sample of





There are two points of note about this function. First, if φΠ = φB and βΠ =
18βB, then Π = B so that the likelihood function reduces to the standard normal
density. Thus, the whole sample speciﬁcation (no sample separation) is nested in the
unknown sample separation speciﬁcation, and the log-likelihoods of the two can be
directly compared using a likelihood ratio test (Dickens and Lang, 1985). Second,
the log-likelihood function contains the log of the sum of likelihoods rather than the
sum of log-likelihoods; this additive inseparability renders the problem analytically
intractable. Fortunately, the parameters can be estimated by maximum likelihood
using the expectation-maximization (EM) algorithm (Dempster, Laird, and Rubin,
1977; Hartley, 1978).
5 Data and Results
We estimate the model using data from 1996 Matlab Health and Socioeconomic Sur-
vey (MHSS) in rural Bangladesh.15 We have 5,328 marriages in this dataset in which
year of marriage is reported (or can be constructed from age and age at marriage)
and a total of 1,869 marriages in which dowry was reported. To deﬂate dowries, we
follow Khan and Hossain (1989) and Amin and Cain (1998) and use the price of rice.
Examining the summary statistics for the whole sample (Table 2), we observe that the
data ﬁts what we would expect given the historical and anthropological evidence: the
proportion of the sample that is Hindu is relatively small, a small share of marriages
are self-arranged, and the majority of husbands and wives have no formal schooling.
There is a signiﬁcant age diﬀerential between husbands and wives—the mean age at
marriage for women is almost ten years younger than for men.16
Before turning to the empirical results, we assess our restriction to positive dowries.
Should positive-dowry-giving marriages be considered within the same model as all
marriages? A priori, we have no sense of whether this should be the case. Our
marriage market model is completely general—yet dowry is an institution that most
households in the world do not adopt, so that we might think that even within a
dowry-giving society, households which use dowry are diﬀerent in kind from those
which do not. We report kernal density estimates of the probability density function
for dowries in Figure 3, where we label “no dowry given” as zero dowry. As the
15Further discussion of the data construction is in the Data Appendix.
16For this reason, we use the eligible sex ratio to test the ”marriage squeeze” hypothesis of (Rao,
1993). . See the Appendix for details of the construction of the series.
19ﬁgure shows, there is no left censoring of dowries—furthermore, there are very few
households that give small dowries. Thus, the distribution of dowries in itself justi-
ﬁes treating non-dowry households separately from dowry-giving households, both in
theory and in empirical estimation.
We now turn to the estimation results. With our speciﬁcation, we present results
for the pooled regression, where we estimate a dowry function analogous to the ex-
isting empirical scholarship. In terms of our model, this is equivalent to restricting
α, the fraction of bequest households, to be either 1 or 0.17 While the central claim
of this paper is that the results from such a regression are misspeciﬁed, we reproduce
them for three reasons: ﬁrst, to check whether our data resembles that used in other
studies; second, to serve as a point of departure for the two-regime results; and third,
we use the estimated coeﬃcients from the whole sample regression as starting values
for coeﬃcients in the regime equations in the EM procedure.
5.1 Empirical Estimates of Dowry Heterogeneity
Table 3 reports the estimation results. The dependent variable in the switching
equation (Column 2) is the probability of being in the ﬁrst regime (Column 3). Here,
since we have restricted the second regime (Column 4) to exclude groom-side and
marriage market variables, this means that the ﬁrst regime is by construction the
price regime, and the second is the bequest regime, as labeled in the table. We begin
by comparing the switching regression results to those of the pooled regression. This
is our ﬁrst check on the validity of the results: does our model capture the data better
than the pooled model? The brief answer is yes: at any conventional signiﬁcance level,
a conservative log-likelihood test indicates that the distribution is indeed a mixture.18
Recall that this speciﬁcation uses two types of theoretical restrictions to improve
17This is the empirical strategy implicitly adopted by Rao (1993); Edlund (2001) and Brown
(2003). In Rao’s case, α is set to 0, while Edlund and Brown both set α to 1.
18The log-likelihood from the pooled regression is -1690, while the log-likelihood from the switching
regression is -1560. Twice the diﬀerence between log-likelihood for the pooled and mixture models
is 260. As discussed in the previous section, a comparison of log-likelihoods is feasible because the
pooled speciﬁcation is nested in the likelihood function for the mixture. However, when the switching
model is constrained to yield the pooled model—that is, when the regime parameters are restricted
to be equal—several parameters are unidentiﬁed. Monte Carlo results indicate that a conservative
likelihood ratio test can be constructed by using the χ2 distribution and setting the degrees of
freedom equal to the number of unidentiﬁed parameters plus the number of constraints (Goldfeld
and Quandt, 1976). For this speciﬁcation, we have 67 degrees of freedom; at 1% signiﬁcance level
this yields a critical value of 96.83, well below our likelihood ratio statistic.
20the sorting of households into regimes. An especially attractive feature of this frame-
work is that the restrictions can be checked against each other: the reduced form
restrictions require the second regime to be the bequest regime, but the coeﬃcients on
the non-membership predictions—the K variables in Column 2—are not constrained
to match. Thus, we have a validity check on the quality of sorting—if the coeﬃcients
on the non-membership variables point to the “wrong” regime as the bequest regime,
we cannot trust that the procedure is correctly placing marriages, or more precisely
we cannot be assured that the regimes that have been identiﬁed correspond to a price
and a bequest regime.
We ﬁnd that this is not the case. Examining the coeﬃcients on the K variables in
the switching equation: “wife has no brothers over 15 at marriage”; “love marriage”;
“husband from same household”; and “wife’s parents died before marriage,” we ﬁnd
that all are statistically signiﬁcant and correspond with Column 4 being the bequest
regime. In the theoretical section, we found that if a bride has no brothers over
15 at the time of marriage, and yet a dowry is exchanged, the household is more
likely to be in the price regime. The coeﬃcient on this variable in the switching
equation is positive (0.126), which points to the ﬁrst regime (Column 3) as the price
regime. The same logic applies to the estimated coeﬃcients on “husband from the
same household” (0.931) and “wife’s parents died before marriage” (0.176): both are
positive and signiﬁcant. Likewise, we found that if the marriage is a love marriage,
and yet a dowry is exchanged, it is more likely to be in the bequest regime. The
coeﬃcient on love marriage is negative (-1.121), which points to the second regime
(Column 4) as the bequest regime. The signs on the four variables in the switching
equation therefore identify the ﬁrst regime as the price regime, and the second regime
as the bequest regime—independent of the reduced-form restriction. That is, the
coeﬃcients all “agree” in the sense that each sign points to the second regime being
the bequest regime, and yet this is not by construction. This is heartening evidence
that the switching regression is correctly identifying regimes.
Second, examining the coeﬃcients on the switching equation (Column 2), we see
that more recent marriages are more likely to be in the price regime (the coeﬃcient
on year of marriage is positive and statistically diﬀerent from zero). We can be even
more precise; controlling for other variables, each year corresponds to an additional
4.5% probability of being in the price regime. Again, this ﬁnding is in accordance with
the overwhelming anthropological and historical evidence of a shift in dowry motive
21from bequest to price over the last few decades. We ﬁnd that Hindu marriages are
more likely to be in the bequest regime, a ﬁnding that corresponds to the historical
evidence. Relative to being nonliterate, we ﬁnd that women with some literacy or
some primary education are more likely to be in the price regime, but that more
educated women are more likely to be in the bequest regime. Polygynous marriages
are more likely to use dowry as price.
Third, the coeﬃcients in the regime equations give two separate dowry functions.
The dependent variable in the regime equations is log real dowry. Controlling for
other variables, we see that dowries are rising by 4.5% a year in the price regime, but
are falling by 5.3% a year in the bequest regime. Controlling for other variables, the
older a woman is at the age of marriage, the lower the dowry amount in the price
regime. In contrast, a woman’s age at marriage does not aﬀect the amount of her
dowry in the bequest regime. In the price regime, the coeﬃcient on the number of
the wife’s brothers is positive and marginally signiﬁcant; this accords with the notion
that households that use dowry as price see sons as an asset—a woman’s brothers
bring in dowries, which then can be used to pay higher dowries in her marriage. In the
bequest regime, in contrast, the number of a woman’s brothers signiﬁcantly decreases
her bequest amount: as parents divide their bequest among their children, having
more brothers results in a smaller bequest. Finally, the coeﬃcient on the eligible sex
ratio in Column 3 is positive and not signiﬁcant. Since this variable is measured as
the fraction of eligible men to women, a negative coeﬃcient would indicate evidence
of a marriage squeeze. Although we should be wary of over-interpreting the point
estimate due to lack of precision, this result corroborates Edlund (2000); Rao (2000);
Dalmia (2004) and Esteve-Volart (2004) in ﬁnding no evidence of a marriage squeeze
driving dowry amounts.
We now split the sample by the estimated probability of membership in the be-
quest regime to compare the characteristics of households in each regime. First, as
reported in Table 4, we ﬁnd that 29% (355 of 1220) of positive-dowry marriages use
dowries as bequests.19 This is in accordance with the bulk of evidence discussed
above, which identiﬁes considerable heterogeneity in dowry motive. Examining Table
4 further, we see that real dowries are substantially higher in the bequest regime (see
19Here, we are following Hartley (1978) in assigning regime membership using the cutoﬀ probability
of 0.5. That is, bequest regime households are those 355 of 1220 households that have a probability
of greater than 0.5 of being in the bequest regime.
22also Figure 4). The mean year of marriage is 1975 in the bequest regime, and 1985
in the price regime—a more straightforward way of seeing this is in Figure 5. More
educated individuals (both the bride and groom and their parents) use dowries as
bequests. Bequest households also tend to be wealthier (as measured by value of to-
tal assets) and live in better-oﬀ circumstances (as measured by whether the village is
electriﬁed and the number of rooms in the household). The general ﬁnding, therefore,
is that poorer, less-educated households are the ones using dowries as a price.
Finally, we can compare our results to claims in the historical literature. One ad-
vantage of using the predictions of the theoretical model, rather than claims grounded
in historical evidence (as in Esteve-Volart (2004) and Anderson (2004)) to sort mar-
riages into regimes is precisely that we can now use historical literature as a validity
check on our results. Figure 5 demonstrates the ﬁrst claim, that dowry as bequest is
on the decline. The second claim, that dowries as bequest are less likely to be cash-
only, is supported by Figure 6, which clearly recovers the pattern in Figure 4. More
precisely, under 16% of bequest households used cash-only dowries, while over 30%
of price households used cash-only dowries; this diﬀerence is statistically signiﬁcant
at the 1% level.
In sum, our results conﬁrm that there is considerable heterogeneity of dowry mo-
tives. The multiple theoretical predictions all agree in assigning regime membership,
evidence that we are properly sorting households into regimes. Consistent with the
theory, the dowry functions of the two regimes diﬀer in important ways, and the aver-
age characteristics of price and bequest households indicate that bequest households
are better oﬀ than price households. Finally, our ﬁndings conﬁrm the claims in the
historical and anthropological literature: bequest dowries are declining in prevalence
over time, and bequest dowries are much less likely to be cash-only.
5.2 Robustness: Relaxing the Theoretical Restrictions
Our primary speciﬁcation used two types of theoretical predictions to identify regimes.
Both types yielded restrictions, about characteristics that predict the non-membership
of a household in a given regime conditional on a positive dowry being given, or about
which variables inﬂuence the amount of a bequest dowry. Our robustness checks assess
the sensitivity of our results to these predictions, by using strictly less information
to identify regimes than that given by theory. We relax both restrictions in turn:
23the ﬁrst check relaxes the non-membership predictions, so that regimes are identifed
solely by their dowry functions, and second check relaxes the reduced form restric-
tions on the dowry function, so that regimes are identiﬁed solely by the information
in the switching equation.
5.2.1 Removing the Non-Membership Predictions
In removing the non-membership predictions from the switching equation, regimes
are identiﬁed using only the reduced form restrictions on the dowry functions. One
advantage of this speciﬁcation is that it does not depend on assumptions about ex-
cludability of additional variables in the switching equation. A disadvantage is that
we have no independent veriﬁcation of the validity of the sorting. Our system be-
comes:
Price regime: DΠ = xβΠ + Π
Bequest regime: DB = xβB + B
Switching equation: λ
∗ = zβλ + λ
Again, DΠ, DB, and λ∗ are latent. Only the dowry amount D is observed, given by:
D =
(
DΠ if λ∗ < 0
DB if λ∗ ≥ 0
Here, we have:
xΠ = {H,W,R} = x
xB = {W}
z = {H,W,R} = x
Table 5 reports the estimation results. Identiﬁcation is given by the dowry
functions—as before, Column 4 is by construction the bequest regime, which con-
tains only bride-side characteristics. Overall, the results agree with our primary
speciﬁcation. The sign and magnitude of almost all estimated coeﬃcients in the
regime equations are similar to those in our primary speciﬁcation. Also, the regime
assignment closely approximates that in our primary speciﬁcation: the correlation of
the estimated switch point between the two speciﬁcations is very high (.958). This
24robustness check corroborates the existence of heterogeneity of dowry motives; even
without the additional information available to us from the theory, the switching re-
gression places households into two separate dowry regimes. As such, our results are
not sensitive to the assumptions allowing the inclusion of additional variables in the
switching equation.
5.2.2 Relaxing the Reduced Form Restriction
As a second robustness check, we drop the reduced form restriction, so that both
dowry functions include the same variables, but maintain the non-membership pre-
dictions in the switching equation. Here, the only method of identifying the regimes
is by examining the sign of the variables K, which are excluded from the regime
equations. The purpose of this exercise is to examine the robustness of our results
to diﬀerent theoretical assumptions; here, we are addressing the robustness of our
results to a breakdown of the assortative matching which allowed us to constrain the
bequest regime. Our three-equation system becomes:
Price regime: DΠ = xβΠ + Π
Bequest regime: DB = xβB + B
Switching equation: λ
∗ = zβλ + λ
Again, DΠ, DB, and λ∗ are latent. Only the dowry amount D is observed:
D =
(
DΠ if λ∗ < 0
DB if λ∗ ≥ 0
Here, we have:
xΠ = {H,W,R} = x
xB = {H,W,R} = x
z = {H,W,R,K}
Table 6 reports the estimation results. As before, the dependent variable in the
switching equation (Column 2) is the probability of being in the ﬁrst regime (Column
3). However, since here we impose no reduced form constraints, we must identify
25the regime from the coeﬃcients on the non-membership K variables in the switching
equation. In this instance, following the logic we used in the main speciﬁcation, the
coeﬃcient estimates identify the ﬁrst regime (Column 3) as the bequest regime.20
We see that the sorting remains similar: comparing the estimates to those of the
original speciﬁcation, we see that all are of the same sign and are again statistically
signiﬁcant. The sorting is not perfect, however, as seen in the non-zero coeﬃcients on
the groom variables in the bequest regime. Otherwise, the estimated coeﬃcients in
Table 6 all point to qualitatively similar results as those in the original speciﬁcation.
Another measure of the quality of the ﬁt is the correlation of the estimated switch
point between the primary speciﬁcation and this one, which is again high (0.87).21
Thus, our results are robust to relaxing the reduced form restriction—we are able to
identify two separate dowry regimes even though they share the same dowry function.
6 Conclusions
Is dowry a bequest or a price? We tackle this question in a novel way, using the
predictions of competing economic theories to investigate the existence and nature
of heterogeneity in dowry motives. We ﬁnd considerable evidence of heterogeneity—
in every speciﬁcation, we reject the null hypothesis of a single dowry function. In
particular, we ﬁnd that more than a quarter of marriages in the sample use dowries
as bequests. We also ﬁnd that each regime yields a dowry function consistent with
the predictions of our model of a bifurcated marriage market. Interestingly, we ﬁnd
little evidence that price dowries are driven by a “marriage squeeze,” a subject of re-
cent debate among economists (Rao, 1993; Anderson, forthcoming; Maitra, 2006b,a),
suggesting instead that changes in bride and groom characteristics may be more im-
portant factors in driving up price dowries over time. Our ﬁndings are consistent
with broad patterns claimed by observers of the history of dowry in South Asia—in
particular, our predicted bequest dowries are much less likely to involve cash-only
transfers, which anthropologists have argued are rarely under the control of brides.
Underlying the empirical results in this paper is an ongoing debate between defend-
ers of dowry as bequest against an increasingly large group of critics who see dowry
20In Table 6 we label the regimes as “price” and “bequest” for convenience.
21Also, in this robustness check and the previous one, the likelihood ratio test reveals that the
mixture model out-performs the pooled regression.
26as a transaction between households in which brides do not directly beneﬁt—and
who blame the dowry system for increasing the perceived cost of daughters and con-
tributing to sex selective abortion, female infanticide and “dowry murders.” Rather
than enter this debate, we oﬀer evidence indicating a broad shift in dowry motive
that derives directly from the bequest theory. As women’s access to inheritances
improves due to stronger property rights, we should expect a decline in the preva-
lence and size of bequest dowries. Corroborating the wealth of anthropological and
historical evidence, we ﬁnd that this is indeed the case: dowry increasingly functions
as a price rather than a bequest, and while price dowries reﬂect “dowry inﬂation”,
bequest dowries have decreased in amount over time. At the same time, we ﬁnd
that households that use dowry as bequest are better oﬀ as measured by a variety
of socioeconomic indicators, including education and assets. While we have not at-
tempted to generate policy implications, our results, taken together, stand against
the principal claims of opponents to dowry bans.
Finally, our methodology can be applied to a broad range of economic problems
where heterogeneous motives are important. Empirical work typically involves pitch-
ing one model against another, whereas there are often reasons to think that conﬂict-
ing theories hold for diﬀerent groups in the population. Our strategy of using theory
to develop multiple predictions to simultaneously separate the sample and validate
the separation can be applied to a wide range of critical debates in economics.
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Figure 1: Matching in the Price Regime 
 














Figure 2: Matching in the Bequest Regime 
(Note: The thick line indicates the potential mates for the bride given her wealth and 
parental transfer τ) 
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Figure 6: Cash-only vs. Non-cash-only Dowries
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36Table 2: Summary statistics
Variable Mean Std. Dev. N
Year of marriage (19–) 69 16.36 5703
Wife’s age 42.3 14.73 5703
Wife’s age at marriage 15.3 3.99 5703
Husband’s age 47.87 14.23 4181
Husband’s age at marriage 24.91 6.47 3758
Wife’s BMI 18.71 2.85 5023
Wife is underweight 0.51 0.5 5023
Wife is normal weight 0.46 0.5 5023
Wife is overweight/obese 0.02 0.15 5703
Husband’s BMI 18.61 2.44 3502
Husband is underweight 0.52 0.5 3502
Husband is normal weight 0.46 0.5 3502
Husband is overweight/obese 0.01 0.1 5703
Wife’s school (years) 1.68 2.71 5616
Wife did not attend school 0.62 0.49 5703
Wife attended some primary school 0.29 0.45 5703
Wife attended some low secondary school 0.07 0.25 5703
Wife attended some high secondary school 0.02 0.16 5703
Husband’s school (years) 3.22 3.82 3760
Husband did not attend school 0.64 0.48 5703
Husband attended some primary school 0.2 0.4 5703
Husband attended some low secondary school 0.09 0.28 5703
Husband some high secondary school 0.07 0.26 5703
Hindu 0.1 0.3 5703
Love marriage 0.01 0.11 5703
Wife’s number of brothers of majority at marriage 1.05 1.26 5703
Wife had no brothers of majority at marriage 0.43 0.5 5703
Husband’s father was richer than wife’s father 0.38 0.49 5689
Wife’s mother’s school (years) 0.61 1.71 5703
Wife’s father’s school (years) 2.2 3.48 5703
Husband’s mother’s school (years) 0.13 0.77 5703
Husband’s father’s school (years) 0.88 2.26 5703
Wife’s parents own land 0.25 0.43 5703
Wife’s parents’ land value (1996 takas) 58607.66 152758.26 5703
Husband’s parents own land 0.37 0.48 5703
Husband’s parents’ land value (1996 takas) 81824.98 166599.15 5703
Wife was previously married 0.14 0.34 5703
Wife’s parents died before her marriage 0.03 0.18 5703
Dowry given at marriage 0.3 0.46 5701
Nominal dowry (takas) 2451.73 6331.31 5685
Real dowry (rice kg) 581.27 4285.52 5685
Real dowry (rice kg, only > 0 dowries) 1939.28 7659.17 1704
Log real dowry (rice kg, only > 0 dowries) 6.62 1.12 1704
37Table 3: Pooled and Switching Regression Results
Pooled Switching Price Bequest
(1) (2) (3) (4)














































Wife’s mother’s school (years) .021 -.071 -.002 -.003
(.018) (.006)
∗∗∗ (.022) (.021)



















Husband’s BMI .022 -.040 .012
(.014) (.005)
∗∗∗ (.013)




















Husband’s parents’ land value (1996 takas, ’000s) .000 .000 .000
(.000) (.000)
∗∗∗ (.000)




Husband’s father’s school (years) -.014 -.003 -.010
(.012) (.004) (.011)















Husband from same household .931
(.041)
∗∗∗
Wife’s parents died before her marriage .176
(.080)
∗∗
Wife had no brothers of majority at marriage .126
(.028)
∗∗∗










F statistic 14.049 509.848 20.256 38.363
Note: Dependent variable in columns (1), (3), and (4) is log real dowry in rice kg (sample
mean is 6.165). Dependent variable in column (2) is the probability of being in column (3).
Statistical signiﬁcance: ∗ 10% ; ∗∗ 5% ; ∗∗∗ 1%. 38Table 4: Household Characteristics by Predicted Regime
Variable Mean Price Mean Bequest
Real dowry (rice kg, only > 0 dowries) 552.68 2238.93∗∗∗
Cash-only dowry 0.30 0.17∗∗∗
Year of marriage (19–) 84.79 74.73∗∗∗
Wife’s age at marriage 17.27 14.65∗∗∗
Wife’s BMI 18.94 19.06
Hindu 0.14 0.23∗∗∗
Wife’s school (years) 1.90 2.46∗∗∗
Wife’s parents’ land value (1996 takas) 53122.9 66310.52
Wife’s mother’s school (years) 0.55 1.12∗∗∗
Wife’s father’s school (years) 2.13 3.25∗∗∗
Wife was previously married 0.11 0.11
Wife’s number of brothers of majority at marriage 1.25 1.37
Husband’s age at marriage 24.62 25.02
Husband’s BMI 18.66 18.98∗∗
Husband’s school (years) 2.16 5.64∗∗∗
Husband’s parents’ land value (1996 takas) 86049.96 135329.45∗∗∗
Husband’s mother’s school (years) 0.02 0.59∗∗∗
Husband’s father’s school (years) 1.13 1.85∗∗∗
Husband is polygynous 0.03 0.01∗∗∗
Village is electriﬁed 0.30 0.50∗∗∗
Rooms 2.75 3.12∗∗∗
Love marriage 0.01 0.03∗
Husband from same household 0.07 0.03∗∗∗
Wife’s parents died before her marriage 0.01 0.02
Value of all wife’s assets (1996 takas) 40287.32 20290.13
Value of wife’s land assets (1996 takas) 24179.53 11453.41
Value of all husband’s assets (1996 takas) 80773.38 220820.64∗∗
Value of husband’s land assets (1996 takas) 65789.37 134998.54∗∗∗
Obs. in Predicted Regimes 865 355
Note: Statistical signiﬁcance: ∗ 10% ; ∗∗ 5% ; ∗∗∗ 1%.
39Table 5: Robustness Check 1: Removing the Non-Membership Predictions
Pooled Switching Price Bequest
(1) (2) (3) (4)
























Wife attended some primary school .093 .246 .091 .059
(.066) (.023)
∗∗∗ (.057) (.076)

















Wife’s mother’s school (years) .021 -.042 -.002 .001
(.018) (.006)
∗∗∗ (.022) (.020)









Wife’s number of brothers of majority at marriage .008 .012 .039 -.038
(.021) (.007) (.018)
∗∗ (.023)





Husband’s BMI .022 -.038 .010
(.014) (.005)
∗∗∗ (.013)




















Husband’s parents’ land value (1996 takas, ’000s) -.0002 .0006 .00006
(.0002) (.00006)
∗∗∗ (.0002)




Husband’s father’s school (years) -.014 -.011 -.012
(.012) (.004)
∗∗∗ (.011)













Husband from same household
Wife’s parents died before her marriage
Wife had no brothers of majority at marriage










F statistic 14.049 483.223 12.924 38.743
Note: Dependent variable in columns (1), (3), and (4) is log real dowry in rice kg (sample
mean is 6.165). Dependent variable in column (2) is the probability of being in column (3).
Statistical signiﬁcance: ∗ 10% ; ∗∗ 5% ; ∗∗∗ 1%.
40Table 6: Robustness Check 2: Relaxing the Reduced Form Restrictions
Pooled Switching Bequest Price
(1) (2) (3) (4)




















Wife is literate but did not attend school -.356 .003 -1.114 .017
(.259) (.089) (.186)
∗∗∗ (.266)
Wife attended some primary school .093 -.212 -.055 .091
(.066) (.023)
∗∗∗ (.079) (.057)

















Wife’s mother’s school (years) .021 .043 -.014 .020
(.018) (.006)
∗∗∗ (.019) (.020)














































Husband’s parents’ land value (1996 takas, ’000s) -.0002 -.00007 -.0002 .00008
(.0002) (.00006) (.0002) (.0002)
Husband’s mother’s school (years) .025 .332 -.025 .009
(.033) (.011)
∗∗∗ (.029) (.048)




















Husband from same household -.700
(.041)
∗∗∗
Wife’s parents died before her marriage -.201
(.079)
∗∗
Wife had no brothers of majority at marriage -.751
(.028)
∗∗∗










F statistic 14.049 485.459 28.345 18.403
Note: Dependent variable in columns (1), (3), and (4) is log real dowry in rice kg (sample
mean is 6.165). Dependent variable in column (2) is the probability of being in column (3).
Statistical signiﬁcance: ∗ 10% ; ∗∗ 5% ; ∗∗∗ 1%. 41Data Appendix
A.1 Matlab Data
The complete dataset is described in Rahman, Menken, Foster, and Gertler (1999).
There are 5312 women for whom year of marriage is reported or can be reconstructed
from age and age at marriage. In addition, we have 391 previous marriages reported,
giving a total of 5703 marriages. Of these, 1731 women report a positive dowry at
the time of marriage. In 562 marriages, the husband conﬁrmed that a dowry was
given, and in 112 marriages, a husband reported a dowry even when the wife did
not.1 This gives a total of 1843 marriages in which dowry was reported. Of these, in
1704 marriages the wife reports the dowry amount (including the value of goods at the
time of marriage). In addition, we have 663 marriages in which the husband reports
the dowry amount but the wife does not. In 556 marriages we have two reports of
dowry; for the results reported, we take the average of the reports.2 All results are
qualitatively similar when we exclude husbands’ dowry reports. Due to other missing
covariates for some marriages, the estimation sample uses 1220 marriages.
Some additional notes on variable construction:
• We use height and weight to calculate Body Mass Index (BMI) and categorize
individuals as underweight, normal weight, or overweight/obese using World
Health Organization guidelines. The vast majority of the sample (97% of women
and 98% of men) have a BMI that is classiﬁed as normal or underweight.
• Level of school attainment (primary, low secondary, or high secondary) are as-
signed from the years of schooling, in accordance with Rahman, DaVanzo, and
1In many instances husbands were not interviewed in the survey.
2Reported dowry amounts between husband and wife are reasonably correlated; the Pearson
correlation coeﬃcient is 0.62.
42Razzaque (2003). The omitted category in the regression results is “wife/husband
did not attend school.”
A.2 Rice Prices
No single source contains rice prices for the entire period, so we constructed a se-
ries using the Statistical Abstracts for British India3 for the period 1910-1946; the
Pakistan Central Statistical Oﬃce’s Statistical Yearbook 1955 for 1949; the Pakistan
Central Statistical Oﬃce’s 20 Years of Pakistan in Statistics for 1950-1967; and the
Statistical Yearbooks of Bangladesh for 1965-1996.4 Duplicate observations for the
years 1964 to 1967 were used to convert between takas and rupees, and overlapping
medium and common rice prices for the years 1950 to 1967 are used to convert between
rice qualities. We used a linear interpolation to cover the missing years (1947-1948).
Real dowries are expressed in (medium quality) rice kilograms.
A.3 Sex Ratio
Constructing a sex ratio time series has proven treacherous in previous dowry work
(Edlund, 2000; Rao, 2000). We adopt a simple approach that takes account of the
mortality trajectory in the years between Census records. We calculate the sex ratio
from the Census Records of India (1931, 1941), Pakistan (1951, 1961), and Bangladesh
(1974, 1984). Where possible, we use the lowest level of geographic detail to corre-
spond with the district in the Matlab study, although this was not possible for early
years of the Census records, particularly the Indian Census records. Taking the count
of males and females in the Census year, we construct the adjusted sex ratio as de-
3Volumes compiled before partition but published afterward are simply called Statistical Abstract,
India.
4Details of the sources as well as unit conversions are given in Table A.
43scribed by Rao (1993), where the adjusted sex ratio gives the number of males aged
20-29 divided by the number of females aged 10-19. We calculate the relevant ratio
for each age group, from ages 10 to age 90, using the same ten year diﬀerential.
For the years between the Census years, the cohorts’ age and mortality, particu-
larly child mortality in the earlier years of our records, is pronounced, so the relevant
sex ratio for each age must be adjusted for mortality each year. We use the actual
number of males and females in the Census year, and then use the period lifetable
constructed with the Census records to derive an estimate of survivorship to the next
age (nqx). Since these values will diﬀer for both men and women, the sex ratio will
change for the years between Censuses. For example, males aged 20-29 in 1961 will be
aged 25-34 in 1966, and the best available estimate for the fraction of men surviving
to that age would be the period survival rate for men aged 25-34 in 1961. For the
ﬁnal Census we use, we create a quasi-synthetic cohort and assume that the course
of mortality over the subsequent years will be the same as for the later cohorts whose
mortality trajectory is recorded in the Census.
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44Table A: Rice Price Sources
Years covered Source Details
1910-1929 Statistical Abstract for British India 1931 No. 300, pg. 671 [Variations in Average Annual
Retail Prices Current of Food Grains in British
India]. Common rice in Dacca, rupees per maund
(base year: 1873= 100 rupees).
1912-1932 Statistical Abstract for British India 1934 No. 301, pgs. 764-765 [Average Annual Retail
Prices Current of Food Grains in British India].
Common rice in Dacca, rupees per maund.
1930-1939 Statistical Abstract for British India 1941 No. 164, pg. 445 [Average Annual Retail Prices
Current of Food Grains in British India].
Common rice in Dacca, rupees per maund.
1942-1946 Statistical Abstract, India 1949 No. 165, pg. 1238 [Average Annual Retail Prices
Current of Food Grains in British India].
Common rice in Dacca, rupees per maund.
1949 Statistical Yearbook 1955,
Pakistan Central Statistical Oﬃce
No. 67, pg. 105 [Average (Annual) Retail Prices
of Important Articles Consumed by the Industrial
Workers at Dacca]. Medium rice, rupees per seer.
1950-1967 20 Years of Pakistan in Statistics,
Pakistan Central Statistical Oﬃce
Table 11.7 [Average Retail Prices of Basic
Articles of Consumption in East Pakistan].
Common and medium rice in Dacca, rupees per
seer.
1965-1967 Statistical Yearbook of Bangladesh 1975 Table 8.1 [Annual Average Retail Price of
Selected Consumer Goods in Dacca, pg. 195].
Medium rice, takas per maund.
1968-1978 Statistical Yearbook of Bangladesh 1979 Table 10.6 [Annual Average Retail Price of
Selected Consumer Goods in Dhaka, pg. 374].
Medium rice, takas per maund.
1978-1988 Statistical Yearbook of Bangladesh 1989 Table 10.16 [Annual Average Retail Price of
Selected Consumer Goods in Dhaka, pg. 448].
Medium rice, takas per seer.
1987-1996 Statistical Yearbook of Bangladesh 1997 Table 10.16 [Annual Average Retail Price of
Selected Consumer Goods in Dhaka, pg. 477].
Medium rice, takas per kilogram.
Unit conversions (2000 Statistical Yearbook of Bangladesh, pgs. 645-650):
1 kilogram = 1.071 seer = .0267 maund.
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